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I. INTRODUCTION
Regulation of telecommunications is at a crossroads. The United
States has utilized the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to
regulate telecommunications almost since the inception of the technology.'
However, the roadmap and principles upon which the FCC operates have
not evolved with changes in technology. 2  Regulation of telephone,
broadcast communication, and wired communications, such as the internet
and cable television, are still segregated and do not account for overlap
among the various telecommunication modalities.3
Conversely, telecommunications regulation in the European
Community has been governed by a variety of sources, including the
Member States and European Commission.4 The European Commission,
however, has only periodically reviewed the needs of Member States in
light of the telecommunications industry and has issued directives that
considered the impact of changing technology.5 As early as 1987, the
European Commission recognized the changing market structure of the
telecommunications indust 7 and the need to respond and regulate
according to this structure. By 1997, the European Commission was
J.D. Candidate, 2006, Northwestern University School of Law.
1 THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING 31 (1994).
2 James B. Speta, Rewriting U.S. Telecommunications Law with an Eye on Europe 2
(2004) (paper presented at TPRC session, Sept. 20, 2003).
3id.
4 PAUL NIHOUL & PETER RODFORD, EU ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS LAW:
COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 33-40
(2004).
'Id. at 34.
6 Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the Development of the
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focusing on the actual changes in technology and possible responses in the
regulatory structure.7  In 2002, the European Commission issued a
Framework Directive aimed at changing the entire approach to
telecommunications regulation and sought to prevent the problem of
regulating developing technologies by re-conceiving the regulated
technologies as "electronic communications" rather than identifying
discrete and already existing technologies.8
This paper argues that the United States should look to the European
Community in order to rework its telecommunications regulatory structure.
More specifically, the United States should reconsider its current system of
regulating various telecommunications sectors separately and follow the
European Commission by developing a "single regulatory framework." 9 By
regulating the telecommunications transmission separately from
telecommunications content, the United States can better anticipate
emerging technologies rather than struggling to catch up with new
technologies as they exceed the reach of the current regulatory framework.
Part II will discuss the U.S. and European telecommunications regulatory
frameworks. Part III will discuss the advantages of a switch to a more
consolidated framework.
The FCC's goals of promoting the public interest, creating
convenience, and the necessity for telecommunications access and
regulation are similar to the broad goals of the European Community
Objectives. 10 By following Europe's lead by first, regulating content and
transmission separately, and second, regulating "electronic
communications" rather than specific, existing technologies, the FCC will
be more able to adjust to new technologies, address overlap of existing
technologies, and answer questions about market forces and consumer
access in the increased bundling of various telecommunications services.
Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87)290 final at 2
[hereinafter 1987 Green Paper].
7 Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media, and Information
Technology Sectors and the Implications for Regulation, COM(97)623 [hereinafter 1997
Green Paper].
8 Council Directive 2002/0184, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 17 [hereinafter Regulatory Framework
Directive].
9 Id. at 3.
10 Compare 42 Stat. 1162 (1927) with Regulatory Framework Directive, supra note 8, at
Art. 8.
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II. BACKGROUND: UNITED STATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION
A. Telecommunications Regulations Prior to the FCC
The FCC acts as the regulatory and licensing body for
telecommunications transmissions and content. The current incarnation of
the FCC evolved from early policies regarding the use of the radio
spectrum.1' Following the proliferation of broadcast facilities in the early
twentieth century, the government initiated regulation of radio
communication with the Radio Act of 1912.12 The statute set aside a
bandwidth range (but not specific frequencies) for broadcast transmissions
and required that radio operators obtain a license from the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor. 13 Improving technology and increased use of then
radio led to the development of commercial broadcast stations in the early
1920s, which was accompanied by the need for designated broadcast
channels due to interference among competing stations. 14 The Secretary of
Commerce initially designated two channels for broadcast frequencies, and
eventually expanded the available frequencies to a designated range of the
spectrum. 5  As demand for broadcast channels exceeded supply, the
Secretary of Commerce attempted to reduce interference by limiting hours
and sharing frequencies between stations. However, the Courts soon ruled
that the Secretary of Commerce had power only to issue licenses and not to
regulate station activity.' 6  This created a situation of uncontrolled,
overlappin broadcasts and "chaos" that spurred the government to
intervene.
Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927 ("1927 Act") as a response to
the "chaotic," uncontrolled radio traffic. 18 The 1927 Act created the Federal
Radio Commission, an administrative agency charged with both licensing
and regulating broadcasters. Significantly, the 1927 Act declared that the
government alone owned the airwaves. The government created a
regulatory commission based on the assumption that the broadcast spectrum
was a scarce and valuable resource. This resource could not be accessible
to everyone who desired it because the result would be the same "chaos"
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 1, at 31.
12 Id. at 5-7.
13 Id.
14 See National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1943).
15 Id.
16 United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. Ill. 1926); Hoover v.
Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
17 KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 1, at 9.
"8 Id. at 12.
19 Id.
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that had occurred prior to the 1927 Act.20  Due to limited access,
broadcasters acted as proxies for the people. On this basis, the government
regulated the broadcasters' access by allocating revocable, limited term
licenses for the "public interest, convenience, or necessity., 21  Using
virtually identical language, the Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act")
re-designated the Federal Radio Commission as the FCC.22
B. FCC Regulatory Structure
The 1934 Act consisted of six titles23 which set the stage for the
regulatory structure which continues to regulate the various
telecommunications modalities under independent schemes. Title II of the
1934 Act focused on so-called "common carriers," referring to telephone
and telegraph services, while Title III focused on broadcast media.24
Congress later added Title VI regulating cable television under the Cable
Communications Policy Act.
25
1. Title II Common Carriers
Common carrier legislation and regulation were initially intended to
cover wired telecommunications services.26  Telephone and telegraph
communications were perceived as a "natural monopoly" early in the
twentieth century. 27 Because of the prohibitive cost of building a wired
telephone or telegraph network combined with the desire to provide
"universal service" to consumers, the government's original legislative and
regulatory approach was to foster and protect AT&T's monopoly in
telephone wires, switches, and services.28 One of the first steps toward
creating this monopoly was the Willis-Graham Act, 29 which allowed
telephone companies to merge by exempting them from antitrust laws.30
Merging all telephone companies into a single system allowed AT&T
to provide multiple services that were not necessarily independently
20 BRUCE M. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 103 (1975).
21 42 Stat. 1162 (1927).
22 48 Stat. 1093 (1934); 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
23 See KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 54 (3d ed. 2000).
24 Id.
25 id.
26 THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 341 (2d ed.
1998).
27 Id. at 344-45.
218 Id. at 348.
29 Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 15, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (1921).
30 Milton Mueller, Telecommunications Access in the Age of Electronic Commerce:
Toward a Third-Generation Universal Service Policy, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 655, 657 (1997).
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profitable by creating "cross-subsidies.' By charging rates that would
allow the company to make an overall profit, AT&T could provide services
that furthered the FCC's "public interest" mindset, but that were less cost-
effective or that would have been cost-prohibitive for competitors.32
Generally, more profitable long distance services offset the prohibitive cost
of providing service to rural areas and lightly used long distance call
routes.
33
Due to two types of advances in technology, common carrier
regulation began to shift away from the natural monopoly model after
World War I1.34  First, less expensive microwave and satellite data
transmission technologies reduced the need for a monopolistic system of
long distance wires.35 Second, due to the advent of digital signal processing
and fiber optic wire, more data could be moved through wires . Present
day common carrier regulation focuses on maintaining "universal service,"
in the colloquial sense, while working under the constraints of a
competitive rather than monopolistic market.37  Common carriers must
strive to provide universal service to customers while taking into account
the costs and benefits of extending services to small, remote populations in
order to maintain a competitive edge.
2. Title III Broadcast Media
Title III of the 1934 Act aimed to regulate the broadcast media.
However, instead of encouraging a monopoly to form as it did for common
carriers, broadcast media regulation focused primarily on the allocation of
what the government perceived as a scarce resource among those
companies best suited to use it. Title III allowed the FCC to regulate the
developing broadcast television industry on the same premise that it had the
radio industry.38 The Supreme Court approved the FCC's administrative
powers designated by Congress and approved FCC regulation of the
broadcast industry.39 The government continued to assert ownership of the
broadcast spectrum and allocated licenses on the basis of its "public
interest" philosophy.4 °
The FCC managed competition for broadcast licenses by holding
31 KRATTENMAKER, supra note 26, at 349.
32 Id. at 349-50.
33 See, e.g., id.; Mueller, supra note 30, at 657.
34 Mueller, supra note 30, at 657-58.
35 KRATTENMAKER, supra note 26, at 347.
36 Id.
37 Mueller, supra note 30, at 658.
38 KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 1, at 34.
39 FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 146 (1940).
40 KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 1, at 34.
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hearings to determine which applicant would best serve this "public
interest. The FCC believed that locally controlled television and radio
stations provided the best means to meet the "public interest" standard.42 In
furtherance of this standard, the FCC distributed licenses and broadcast
channels to minimize interference between stations and to promote local
participation in the broadcast industry.
The FCC feared that larger markets would dominate the broadcast
market and take up all available bandwidths, effectively squeezing smaller
and more rural communities out of broadcasting.43 Using 47 U.S.C. §
307(b), which requires that the Commission distribute "licenses,
frequencies, hours of operation, and power among the several States and
communities ... ," to justify its policy, the FCC allocated bandwidths across
the country according to population and geography in an attempt to protect
small markets.4
The FCC determined that the best way to serve the "Public interest"
was to assign specific bandwidths to specific communities. It proposed a
Table of Assignments ("TOA") to make the most efficient use of the
available television channels.46 The TOA allocated the number of channels
to various communities based on their population with respect to
geographic area, with most, of the twelve powerful VHF channels going to
the largest markets.47 The FCC's top two priorities for the TOA were to
provide television service to the entire country and to provide each
community with its own broadcast station. 48 Once the FCC had allocated
channels to achieve these two goals, it then set its sights on provision of at
least two television services to the entire country, and a second broadcast
station for each community.4 9 Any remaining channels were assigned to
communities based on their population, geographical location, and available
television services. 50 This policy effectively limited the maximum number
of stations in any market.
The FCC justified the TOA by claiming it was the most efficient
method to allocate the limited number of available channels and the best
41 Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33
J.L & EcON. 133, 136 (1990).
42 David M. Silverman & David N. Tobenkin, The FCC's Main Studio Rule: Achieving
Little for Localism at a Great Cost to Broadcasters, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 469, 475 (2001).
43 See Amendment of Section 3.606 of Comm'n's Rules & Regulations, Sixth Report &
Order, 41 F.C.C. 148 16 (1952) [hereinafter Sixth Report & Order].





49 Sixth Report & Order, supra note 43, 63.
50 Id. 16.
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way to protect the interests of individuals living in less populous areas.5
First, the FCC predicted that a TOA would lead to more efficient use of the
available channels because of the fixed amount of space required between
each channel to prevent interference between signals on adjacent
channels.52 A preset plan would allow each channel to be used in a
maximum number of locations, thus maximizing the total number of areas
served. The FCC expected that a TOA would minimize the number of
areas without service.
5p
Second, the TOA was also intended to protect the interests of people in
small communities which were not able to support their own television
stations but might be able to in the future.54 The FCC feared that by the
time these smaller markets were able to support a station, the larger markets
would have used all of the available channels.55  The FCC rejected an
alternate allocation plan that would have provided television service to a
larger number of people rather than a larger number of communities. 6
Finally, the FCC locked the TOA into place by refusing to accept
applications for channels not designated on the Table with a few
exceptions.57 In order to apply for channels not on the TOA, applicants
would have to lobby for an amendment to the TOA through FCC rule
making proceedings. 58 The FCC justified this procedure based on the
"public interest" argument that too many petitions for change would make
the Table too complex.59 The TOA still governs the available broadcast
channels in each community.
6°
3. Broadband, Cable and Emerging Technologies
The FCC regulated cable television from its inception in the mid-
twentieth century until the 1980s in a piecemeal fashion.61 Congress did
not expressly confer power and guidelines to regulate cable television until
the Cable Act of 1984, when it added Title VI to the 1934 Act.62










60 47 C.F.R. 73.606 (2004).
61 See generally KRATTENMAKER, supra note 26, at 509-17.
62 JOHNE THORNE, PETER W. HUBER & MICHAEL K. KELLOGG, FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW
143 (1995).
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broadcast spectrums, thus frustrating the separate regulatory schemes that
the FCC has historically applied between wired and wireless
communications.63 The FCC has struggled to respond to, let alone
anticipate, these technologies, and in some cases, the market finds its own
solution before the FCC catches up and makes a decision.64
While the FCC first asserted authority over cable television systems
for retransmitting broadcast signals, cable television has historically been a
wired communication with hardware more similar to the Title II common
65carriers. Initial regulation of cable television systems was designed to
protect broadcasters from potential economic injury; however, later
legislation authorizing FCC regulation created policy goals for cable
television which eventually lead to deregulation of the industry.66 The FCC
maintained regulatory control over cable television which it used to help
sustain broadcast television by promulgating "must carry" rules, requiring
cable to carry local television station signals. 67 This not only worked to
protect "free" broadcast television but also to ostensibly fulfill the public
interest goal of localism.
Various emerging technologies for data distribution, driven by
broadband technology, have begun to create convergence among different
modalities in the FCC's three regulatory schemes. Both wired and wireless
broadband providers have begun to merge services such as television,
telephone, and internet into bundled, single-access point products.68 This
has led to regulatory confusion and the application of antiquated regulatory
schemes to technologies and companies that do not easily fit into neat
packages.
Included in the confusion over how to regulate the industry,
deregulation of the telecommunications industry per se is an ongoing issue
in the United States.69  The vague "public interest" philosophy of the
regulation 70 has left the door wide open for the industry to argue that
deregulation of the market is in the public interest. On the other hand,
consumer advocates have argued exactly the opposite. The result is that
courts are forced to arbitrate disputes over various policy decisions of the
FCC. Among the most debated issues are limits on ownership of television
and radio stations in the same market, and limits on cross-ownership of
63 Id. at 62-63.
4 Id. at 74-75.
65 CREECH, supra note 23, at 151.
66 Id. at 152-53.
67 Id. at 156-57.
68 See generally id. at 310-19.
69 See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal Communications Commission, 373 F.3d
372 (3d Cir. 2004).
70 See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 1, at 34.
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broadcast media and news outlets in the same market.7 '
III. EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
A. History of European Community Regulation
In Europe, a government monopoly historically controlled both the
broadcast spectrum and the broadcast media.72 Partially in response to
service and technology advances in the United States, the European
Commission moved to change the regulatory structure. 3 The Commission
published a Green Paper in 1987 outlining how to develop the common
European market for telecommunication services and equipment.74  In
anticipation of a single European market, which was scheduled to come into
existence in 1992, 75 the Commission noted certain trends in
telecommunications that needed to be addressed. Included were a more
"competitive framework," changes in the infrastructure, competition among
suppliers, manufacturer transitions, and equipment standardization.76 Over
the next few years, the Commission issued directives to increase
competition in the European market and break the nationalistic
stranglehold.77
1. The 1987 Green Paper and Subsequent Directives
The European Commission used several obscure provisions of the
European Community Treaty to support its decisions to promote
competition in the telecommunications industry.78 In particular, Article 90
of the Treaty prevented member states from granting "special or exclusive
rights" contrary to various other rules in the treaty. 9 Article 90 further
provided that entities established as revenue producing monopolies may not
hinder the performance of one another and must not limit the development
of trade.80 Relying on these provisions, the European Commission argued
that monopolies were subject to the competition rules of the Treaty. 81
71 See Prometheus, supra note 69, at 381.
72 NIHOUL & RODFORD, supra note 4, at 33.
73 Id.
74 1987 Green Paper, supra note 6, at 1.
71 Id. at 3.
76 Id. at 5.
77 See NIHOUL & RODFORD, supra note 4, at 34.
78 id.
79 Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 90, para. 1, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C 340) 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty], available at http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/
entr6d05.htm#Article_90.
80 Id. at para. 2.
81 NIHOUL & RODFORD, supra note 4, at 35.
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Utilizing its power to issue directives to enforce Article 90 of the Treaty,
the European Commission promulgated directives to increase competition
in the telecommunications industry. 82 Some Member States, unhappy with
their inability to continue operating telecommunications monopolies,
appealed to the Court of Justice of the European Communities to annul the
83directives. However, the Court ruled that the European Commission had
the power to identify obligations under the Treaty and thus the directives
were legal and would stand.84
Succumbing to the European Commission's directives requiring
competition in the telecommunications industry, the Member States moved
to harmonize their laws governing several telecommunications areas.85
Terminal equipment requirements were harmonized so that technology
across the European Union was compatible.86 Authorization to provide
telecommunications services were standardized across Member States. 87
An Open Network Provision was instituted to allow networks to be more
easily connected across Member States.88 Universal conditions to access
existing facilities were instituted less to regulate cross-border activity, but
more to establish a framework to regulate operators across the European
Union. 89 Finally, provisions to ensure the access of disabled persons were
enacted. 90
2. 1992 Review and the 1994 Green Paper
The European Commission reviewed the resulting state of the
telecommunications industry in 1992. 91  In this review the European
Commission suggested that Member States liberalize infrastructures not
owned by the local Telecommunications Operators, liberalize cable
television, and review the policy of public telecommunications by 1996.92
The Commission also proposed to completely liberalize
telecommunications services by 1998. 93 To further define its goals, the
European Commission issued a two-part Green Paper in 1994 directing the
82 EC Treaty, supra note 79, art. 90, para. 3.
83 NIHOUL & RODFORD, supra note 4, at 37.
84 See Case C-202/88 France v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1223; C-271/90 Spain v.
Comm'n, 1992 E.C.R. 1-5833.
85 NIHOUL & RODFORD, supra note 4, at 37.
86 Id. at 38.
87 Id. at 39.
88 Id.
89 id.
90 Id. at 39-40.
91 ANTONIO BAVASSO, COMMUNICATIONS IN EU ANTITRUST LAW: MARKET POWER AND
PUBLIC INTEREST 34 (2003).
92 Id. at 35.
93 Id.
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Member States to extend telecommunications liberalization beyond the
telephone system.
94
The 1994 Green Paper aimed to work within the existing
telecommunications policy framework to increase competition, consider
technological and infrastructure advances and trends, develop a more global
regulatory framework, and regulate to promote growth, competition, and
employment in the telecommunications sector. 95 The 1994 Green Paper
further purported to increase competition in the terrestrial infrastructure of
telecommunications. As of 1994, only the United Kingdom, Finland, and
Sweden had competitive rather than monopolistic markets for
infrastructure.96 The Commission concluded that the regulatory structure
present at that time was limiting telecommunications development and
advancement, and that the regulations were obstructing multimedia
advancements.97
The Commission pointed to changing market structures that
necessitated changes in the regulatory environment. Specifically, the
Commission pointed to the explosion in wireless services and companies,
the increasing number of telecommunications companies that were
developing in response to liberalization, international and cross-border joint
ventures, increased privatization of Telecommunications Operators
resulting in strategic alliances, and the birth of new telecommunications
service providers that bundled and priced services.
98
The Commission also considered technological advancements and
trends that required a new regulatory structure, including the increasing
importance of wireless technologies and convergence of
telecommunications services. 99 The Commission pointed to regulatory
agendas in the United States and Japan which pushed for development of
"information highways" with five goals in mind: "[(1) to] encourage private
investment; [(2) to] provide and protect competition; [(3) to] provide open
access to the network; [(4) to] take action to avoid creating a society of
haves and have-nots; [and to (5)] encourage flexible and responsive
governmental action."' 0 The Commission concluded that market forces
94 See Green Paper on the Liberalisation of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable
Television Networks: Part I-Principle and Timetable, COM(1994)440 (final October 25,
1994) [hereinafter 1994 Green Paper I]; Green Paper on the Liberalisation of
Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks: Part II-A Common
Approach to the Provision of Infrastructure for Telecommunications in the European Union,
COM(1994)682 (final January 25, 1995) [hereinafter 1994 Green Paper II].
95 1994 Green Paper II, supra note 94.
96 Id. at 15.
9' Id. at 24.
98 Id. at 25-26.
99 Id. at 29-32.
"' Id. at 35-36.
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were required to explore telecommunications innovation, and that niche
markets were the fastest growing segments of the telecommunications
industry. 101
In its conclusions in the 1994 Green Paper, the European Commission
outlined the licensing infrastructure while keepin0 in mind its goals of
harmonization, liberalization, and fair competition. It also emphasized
the goal of interconnection between the telecommunications networks of
member states. 0 3  To achieve this interconnection, the Commission
proposed to remove barriers to interconnection, to allow for commercial
negotiation of interconnection agreements, to allow national regulatory
authorities to supervise this negotiation, and to have common principles at
the European Union level. 1
04
3. The 1997 Green Paper
While the 1994 Green Papers further opened the door for
telecommunications competition and proliferation in the European
Community, the European Commission turned its attention to changing
technologies with a 1997 Green Paper on technology convergence. 10 5 The
Commission recognized that the structure of the telecommunications
industry was changing such that telecommunications devices performed
multiple functions. Improvements in digital technology allowed service
providers to combine different services, while digital broadcast technology
allowed consumers to choose broadcast products on demand rather than on
a set broadcast schedule (e.g. videos on-demand, pay-per-view).10 6
The Commission pointed to these changing technologies and the
resulting changes in market structure as a reason to reassess the landscape
of telecommunications regulation. The Commission urged consideration of
the reasons for regulation, and difficulties in maintaining a consistent
regulatory scheme with quickly fluctuating technologies. 10 7 Due to rapidly
proliferating technologies, the Commission also considered that
conceptualizations of broadcast bandwidth and licenses as scarce resources
may become outdated.1°8
Among the regulatory issues that the Commission addressed in the
1997 Green Paper were the possible need for new definitions of
telecommunications activities, the possible changes to market entry and
1o1 1994 Green Paper II, supra note 94, at 40.
102 Id. at 59-61.
103 Id. at 70.
104 Id. at 71.
105 1997 Green Paper, supra note 6.
106 Id. at 4-5.
107 Id. at 19.
108 Id. at 19-20.
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licensing, access to networks and systems, access to the broadcast spectrum,
technological standards, and pricing.'0 9  The Commission outlined
principles for future regulation based on these issues, and suggested
regulatory approaches and timetables."0  The principles and approaches
were forward looking, and laid out in light of the significant advancements
that had taken place in the past and that the Commission anticipated would
continue to shift the telecommunications market in the future. This market-
driven convergence approach to regulation indicated a significant change
from the older regulatory framework in which broadcasting,
telecommunications, and information technologies were regulated
separately.'
Following up on the 1997 Green Paper, the Commission issued a
review based on responses to its proposals for regulatory change.' 1 2 In the
1999 Communications Review, the Commission provided for the
development of a new framework directive within which to determine
modem telecommunications regulation." 3  This new framework sought
minimal regulation while providing more legal certainty in the changing
market.1 4  The framework also was to include separate and specific
directives regarding consumer privacy, universal service, access and
interconnection, and authorization and licensing."15 In response to the 1999
Communications Review, the European Parliament issued a series of
directives implementing this new framework.
B. Modem European Community Telecommunications Regulation: The
Framework Directives
In 2002, the European Parliament and European Union Council issued
several directives relating to a new regulatory framework for
telecommunications." 6 The Framework Directive laid out new definitions
for telecommunications that covered a broader range of technologies and
network architectures." 7 It also directed Member States to have national
10 9 Id. at 21-26.
110 Id. at 33-35.
111 See NIHOUL & RODFORD, supra note 4, at 56.
112 Commission 1999 Communications Review, COM (1999) 539 final (Nov. 10, 1999).
113 Id. at ii.
114 Id. at v.
115 Id.
116 Council Directive 2002/19, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 7 (EC) [hereinafter Access Directive];
Council Directive 2002/20, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 21 (EC) [hereinafter Authorisation Directive];
Council Directive 2002/22, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 51 (EC) [hereinafter Universal Service
Directive]; Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 37 (EC) [hereinafter Privacy
Directive]; Council Directive 2002/21, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33 (EC) [hereinafter Framework
Directive].
117 Framework Directive, supra note 116, at 38-39.
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regulatory agencies that were independent of service providers, even if the
Member States retained ownership of the services. 18  These national
regulatory authorities were required to create a successful market by
following specific policy objectives.'' 9 First, the national regulatory
authorities had to promote competition in the telecommunications sector by
ensuring "maximum benefit in terms of choice, price, and quality," ensuring
no limitation on competition, promoting investment and innovation, and
"efficient use and... effective management" of bandwidth frequencies and
station numbers. 20  Second, the national regulatory authorities had to
develop the market by getting rid of impediments to trans-European
networks, actively encouraging the development of these networks,
guaranteeing equal treatment of networks, and cooperating with other
Member States' regulatory agencies as well as the European
Commission.'12 Finally, national regulatory authorities had to better serve
citizens by making certain that everyone had universal service, enacting
consumer protection measures, maintaining data privacy, and complying
with social policies providing access to disabled persons.122 In addition to
specific policy guidelines, the Framework Directive outlined the various
responsibilities of the national regulatory agencies for managing the radio
spectrum, determining names and numbers, rights of way, and facility
sharing. 1
23
In 1997, the Commission explored convergence less in the
technological sense, and more in terms of the market structure. Changes in
technology allowed certain telecommunications service providers to offer a
wider array of services over their existing networks.124 For example, cable
companies could provide not only broadcast and subscription television, but
also internet access, telephone services, and pay-per-view services. 25 The
Commission saw a collapse in the market structure as the delineation
between content, packaging, service, infrastructure, and terminals began to
blur, and a larger number of companies became involved in more parts of126
the market structure. Because of the resultant market concentration in
industry structure convergence, the Commission was cautious about the
development of private monopolies in the telecommunications sector. An
increasing trend in mergers, joint ventures, and strategic alliances drew
118 Id. at 39-40.
119 Id. at 40-41.
120 Id.
121 Id. at art. 8(2)-(3).
122 Id. at art. 8(4).
123 Regulatory Framework Directive, supra note 8, at arts. 9-12.
124 1997 Green Paper, supra note 7, at ch. 1.1.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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continuing scrutiny from the Commission. 127
The technology that has driven merging services is the ability to
transmit and receive digital signals in broadcast and telecommunications
technology. 128  These advances have allowed for increased data
transmission on the broadcast spectrum, paving the way for wireless
technologies.
The increasing availability of wireless technology has led to an
increase in technological convergence in which wireless, or mobile,
technology is combined with fixed, or wired, technology. One example of
convergence between fixed and mobile technology is a mobile device that
may transmit to a local antenna, which is wired to an antenna in another
location, which then transmits to a second mobile device. 129  Mobile
technology may also work to transmit wired signals locally, as in the case
of cordless telephones and wireless internet routers.
1 30
By recognizing the inevitability of convergence through both business
combinations and technological innovation, the European Commission was
able to create a revised regulatory framework that addressed electronic
communications across the board rather than segmenting broadcast media
and telecommunications into separate regulatory schemes. For example,
prior to the Framework Directive, the United Kingdom's
telecommunications were regulated by five separate bodies: the Office of
Telecommunications (Oftel); Independent Television Commission;
Broadcasting Standards Commission; Radio Authority; and
Radiocommunications Agency.1 31 Guided by the convergence framework
of the European Commission, the United Kingdom passed the
Communications Act of 2003, which combined the functions of these
agencies into a single body called the Office of Communications
("OFCOM"). 132 This consolidation eliminated agency overlap in regulation
and supervision, while creating a more efficient regulatory body that was
closer in function to the Framework Directive's structure.
The Framework Directive combined all electronic transmissions under
the same regulatory scheme. It did so by expanding the definition of
electronic communications network to include not only transmission but
also "switching or routing equipment and other resources which permit the
conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by optical or by other
electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and
127 Id.
128 NIHOUL & RODFORD, supra note 4, at 48.
129 See id. at 45.
130 Id.
13 Regulation in the UK, at http://www.btplc.com/Thegroup/Regulatoryinformation/
RegulationsintheUK/RegulationintheUK.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
132 The Communications Act, 2003, c. 1, § 1 (U.K.).
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packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks,
electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of
transmitting signals, networks used for radio and television broadcasting,
and cable TV networks, irrespective of the type of information
conveyed.' '133 While conceptualizing regulation under a convergence theme
was new, the rules that the European Parliament applied approximated
previous telecommunications rules, now extended to include broadcast
media and data transmission.134 However, even though the Framework
Directive used a convergence concept in regulating transmissions and the
business side of the telecommunications industry, it did not address content
regulation. 135 The Commission has not yet addressed such questions as
how content and transmission may overlap, and how transmission may
affect content through intermediary recipients. 136
One European concern with business convergence in the technological
sector is the problem of dominance and market power. The Access
Directive is suspicious of joint actions, monopolies, and abuse of dominant
market power in a way that the U.S. regulatory policy is not. In fact, United
States courts have placed the burden of proof on the party complaining of
market leveraging rather than on the alleged monopolizing party. 37 The
Access Directive also does not rule out price controls in dominated
markets.1
38
The Access Directive focuses mainly on the ability of networks to
expand to new Member States while maintaining a competitive market and
preventing domination by a single company or country. 39 Member States
are required to allow networks that wish to provide services to those States
an opportunity for open negotiation to access those markets. 140 Network
operators are directed in their rights and responsibilities in providing public
communication services. These rights and responsibilities are enforced by
national regulatory authorities within each Member State, such as OFCOM
in the United Kingdom. 41 Among the obligations of network providers
defined in the Access Directive are transparency in dealing, 142 non-discrimination, 143 accounting separation, 144  and access to, or use of,
133 Regulatory Framework Directive, supra note 8, at art. 2(a).
134 NIHOUL & RODFORD, supra note 4, at 49.
135 See Regulatory Framework Directive, supra note 8, at Preamble, recital 5. [can
shorten Preamble to prmble. but I would leave as is]
136 See NIHOUL & RODFORD, supra note 4, at 50-51.
137 Speta, supra note 2, at 3.
138 Access Directive, supra note 116, at Preamble, recital 20.
139 Id. at art. 1.
140 Id. at art. 3.
141 Id. at art. 5(1).
141 Id. at art. 9.
141 Id. at art. 10.
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specific facilities. 145  While obligations regarding access to specific
facilities are up to the national regulatory authorities' determination, factors
that that authorities must take into account are delineated. 1
46
National regulatory authorities are also governed by procedural
mandates from the Access Directive. 47  Authorities must publish
information about network providers and must notify the Commission of
network operators that have "significant market power."' 148 This mandate is
in line with the Framework Directive's special controls on network
operators with "significant market power."'149 While dominance and market
power had in the past been separate concepts,150 the Framework Directive
equated the two by defining "significant market power" as a "position
equivalent to dominance."' 5' Historically, dominance meant "the position
of economic strength acquired by an undertaking and which permits that
undertaking to behave, to an appreciable extent, independently of
competitors, customers and ultimately consumers."'
52
National regulatory authorities have discretion to impose obligations
on parties with significant market Sower even before the dominant party
negotiates with the other party. 1  Dominant parties must, however,
negotiate in good faith to allow access to less dominant parties.
54
Member State governments must create administrative access
structures but may not "create barriers for entry into the market."'' 55 The
goal of the Access Directive was to "harmoni[ze] and sirmplify[y]"
conditions for market access. 56  By authorizing access of operators,
Member States must consider operators' applications to build facilities, and
must allow operators to provide electronic communications services.
Member States are allowed to have different standards of scrutiny for radio
stations; however, radio spectrum policy and decisions are specifically
governed by the Radio Spectrum Decision.
157
144 Access Directive, supra note 116, at art. 11.
141 Id. at art. 12.
146 Id. at art. 12(2).
141 Id. at ch. IV.
148 Id. at art. 16.
149 Regulatory Framework Directive, supra note 8, at art. 14.




53 Id. at 221-222.
154 Access Directive, supra note 116, at 12(i)(b).
155 Authorisation Directive, supra note 116, at Preamble, recital 31.
156 Id. at art. 1(1).
157 Decision No. 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March
2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community
(Radio Spectrum Decision), 2002 O.J. (L 108) 4-5.
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IV. CONVERGENCE AND UNITED STATES REGULATION
Unlike Europe, the United States has not yet adjusted its regulatory
framework to adapt to convergence theories. Legislation has taken a
patchwork approach, adding to the 1934 Communications Act's basic
framework as new technologies or problems have emerged.'58 This failure
to adjust the regulatory structure to fit the telecommunications market led to
controversy regarding exactly what types of electronic communications the
FCC has control over. 159
The United States' framework regarding broadcast spectrum is most in
need of adjustment. Regulation of the broadcast spectrum continues to
operate on the presumption that broadcast wavelengths are a limited
resource. As technology advances, this presumption becomes less and less
feasible.
Scholars have argued for decades that the FCC's regulatory approach
toward allocating bandwidth is inefficient. 160 However, much of the FCC's
policy has been driven by an assumption that the broadcast bandwidth is a
limited public resource that must be allocated.' 61 This assumption may be
erroneous not only because advanced technology allows more broadcast
channels per bandwidth segment, but because advances in receiving
equipment allow broadcasting on spread spectrums rather than on specific
bandwidths.
Even without new technology, the existing broadcast bandwidth is not
being efficiently utilized. 162 Bandwidth designated for rural areas and UHF
television station allocations are some of the least used bandwidth, with
spectrum allocated to the federal government almost completely vacant at
any given time. 163  From a technological perspective the conception of
bandwidth as a scarce resource is erroneous - the problem lies instead with
the sensitivity of receivers or antennae.' 64
Digital receivers do not have to reconstruct the message signal like
analog receivers do - they only need to determine whether a "0" or "1" of a
binary signal was transmitted. Because a digital signal that has been
slightly altered by other nearby waves still very closely approximates the
binary signal, digital is much less susceptible to interference than is
158 Speta, supra note 2, at 3.
9 Id. at 5.
160 See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1959).
161 See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 1, at 14.
162 See On the Same Wavelength, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 12 2004, at 57 [hereinafter Same
Wavelength].
163 Id. at para. 11.
164 Id. at para. 14.
Anticipating Regulation of New Telecommunications Technologies
26:447 (2006)
analog. 65 While digital signals initially took up more broadcast bandwidth
space than analog signals, signal compression has increased the availability
of bandwidth. In compression digital signals, redundancies in the signal are
removed. This means if a subsequent picture or sound is substantially
similar to the one immediately preceding it, only the changes in the picture
or sound are sent on the digital signal, rather than resending the entire
signal. At a standard level of resolution (as opposed to high definition),
signal compression allows four to eight more standard broadcast stations in
the bandwidth needed for one analog broadcast station.
A. Developing Technologies
While television and radio bandwidths are still limited and allocated
by FCC regulation, technologies that use radio frequency bandwidth
scanning in an open spectrum concept are more problematic because
regulation is currently defined by specific frequency allocations rather than
broadband scanning or use. While the FCC has set technological standards
for technologies like ultra-wideband, it has chosen not to regulate access to
the broadcast bandwidth for these technologies as a subsection of radio
frequency devices. 
66
Ultra-wideband technology operates over frequencies that are already
licensed for other uses. Currently the FCC permits ultra-wideband
broadcasts between 3.1 and 10.6 GHz. 167  Present day ultra-wideband
broadcasts are low level, low power transmissions that create minimal
interference with the existing signals that they broadcast over.
Ultra-wideband technology is a form of "spread spectrum" technology
that spreads a signal over a broad range of frequencies at low power. Also
included in this technology are wireless internet systems, which broadcast
over the same spectrum ranges as cordless telephones. 68  Other
technologies may make the concept of unlimited bandwidth a reality,
including "smart" antennae. These antennae can discriminate certain
signals from background noise. 1
69
"Mesh networking" is another type of technology that may do away
with the idea of a scarce broadcast spectrum. Receivers of signals
retransmit to the next receiver down the line. This allows a low power
signal similar to ultra-wideband to be transmitted across a network without
using a high-powered electromagnetic signal that may be more likely to
165 August Grant, Digital Television, Museum of Broadcast Communications,
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/D/htmlD/digitaltelev/digitaltelev.htm (last visited Jan.
18, 2006).
166 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.501-15.525 (2001).
167 47 C.F.R. § 15.509 (2001).
168 Same Wavelength, supra note 162, at para. 15.
169 Id. at para. 16.
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create interference or noise in adjacent signals.1 70
The most futuristic and promising technologies are "cognitive radios,"
which would be able to discriminate signals from ambient noise, to move
around the bandwidths looking for an open frequency on which to transmit,
and to encode data in new forms of digital signals. 17  Per Kevin Kahn,
Director of the Communications Technology lab at Intel, "Communication
is no longer a matter of frequency, but of computation."'
7 2
Lower frequencies, on which radio and television currently broadcast,
are better able to penetrate obstacles such as walls. 173 This is part of the
reason why the higher frequencies, or the so-called "garbage spectrum", are
used more universally, but in short range transmissions.174  By re-
conceptualizing the broadcast bandwidth as an unlimited resource, even a
small amount of broadcast space in the penetrating lower frequencies could
have an impact.
B. Recent U.S. Lawmaking Efforts
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act) is the legislature's
most recent foray into broad scale telecommunications regulation. The
1996 Act did not expand the FCC's authority to specifically regulate the
Internet.175  The FCC's authority to regulate broad areas of electronic
communication is still uncertain and not statutorily provided for.176 This is
problematic for the future of U.S. telecommunications regulation as
converging technologies emerge in which regulated and unregulated
functions overlap. In addition, states may not regulate areas that the FCC
does not.'77 States may not limit telecommunications service providers'
entry into the market. 78 While this approximates the Access Directive for
the European Community, the issue being addressed is not the same. The
Access Directive intervened in state-created monopolies that were
controlling and limiting the telecommunications market by maintaining
exclusive control. The 1996 Act prevents states from regulating or
preventing the occurrence of de facto monopolies within a particular state.
While preventing states from limiting access may work to expand the
market, it may also result in unchecked market dominance that is not
170 Id. at para. 17.
171 Id. at para. 18.
172 id.
173 Same Wavelength, supra note 162, at para. 26.
174 Id. at paras. 26, 28.
175 Speta, supra note 2, at 3.
176 James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting It,
35 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 15, 22-26 (2003).
177 Speta, supra note 2, at 4.
178 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2001).
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controlled by provisions for universal service.
C. Proposed Changes to the Regulatory Structure
1. Approximating the European Model
The FCC's public interest, convenience, and necessity provisions for
broadcast telecommunications access and regulation are generally similar to
the broad goals of the European Community's Access Directive, Universal
Service Directive, and Authorization Directive. The FCC, however, is
limited in its scope such that it has limited power to regulate newer
technologies. The United States' legislature has begun to consider the
prospect of addressing the gaps in present telecommunications law.
Referring to potential changes in telecommunications law, Senator George
Allen remarked:
As many of us know, the 1996 Telecommunications Act was the first
major overhaul of the communications policy in over 60 years. Since the
passage of that law, remarkable changes have occurred in the
technologies used to deliver telecommunications services. Some of these
changes may be products of the 1996 act. However, many are due to the
tremendous explosion of new and advanced broadband technologies. 7 9
Even acknowledgement of the growing broadband industry does not
address the broader technological advances made in electronic
communications. If the legislation does not address emerging technologies
like spread spectrum, smart antennae, mesh networking, and cognitive
radios, then U.S. telecommunications regulation will continue to remain in
the same position - behind the times and unable to apply existing
regulations and laws to emerging technologies.
2. Potential Problems
In addition to growth in available technology, both horizontal and
vertical bundling of services due to changes in the market and technology
will require adjustments in market and technological architecture.
Horizontal bundling of services increases efficiency in information delivery
by allowing consumers to access multiple services from a single device or
access point. This sort of "one stop shopping" has become increasingly
available, and is of particular interest to businesses who may want to
decrease their hardware expenditures. Improvements in technology will
lead to increased opportunities to bundle services into a single device, while
various forms of content production may be linked to a content offer. If an
179 150 Cong Rec. S11671 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 2004) (statement of Sen. Allen.).
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integrated device allows for user feedback (or "cookies" similar to Internet
usage), content providers can tailor and market their content and advertising
more narrowly to consumers, while consumers will encounter less
irrelevant content.
Vertical bundling of services may occur due to strategic alliances or
mergers in which content production and service provision are part of the
same company. Service providers may also become more interested in
joining with companies that create the infrastructure so that they might
more quickly integrate their content into emerging forms of infrastructure
and technology.
Bundling, however, may lead to future problems, both legal and
market-based. In the United States, the modem trend has been less
regulation and less control of market dominance. Thus, U.S.-based
companies will have to consider their market dominance when infiltrating
and cross pollinating foreign markets. The European regulatory structures
are designed to exclude domination by the economic powers of the United
States and United Kingdom. The United States must also address
harmonization of technology with the European Union - current
technological standards in the United States do not effectively mesh with
the European Union.
Although the United States has experienced a de-regulatory climate
over the past twenty years, bundled services will still have to anticipate
possible antitrust issues. It remains unclear how many services might be
bundled and how much market domination the United States courts will
allow. 180
V. CONCLUSION
The United States' current regulatory policy regarding
telecommunications is due for an update. While the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 attempted to adjust the law to changing times and technologies,
the legislation did not adequately anticipate new technologies or changes in
the market structure due to advancing technologies and bundling of
services. The United States should act to rework its entire approach to
telecommunications regulation by breaking down the boundaries between
various technologies and using the "electronic communications" approach
utilized by the European Community in its 2002 Framework Directive. The
general goals of current U.S. telecommunications policies and the European
Framework Directive are similar; the Framework Directives could, thus, be
a useful roadmap to new legislation and regulation in the United States.
1s0 For more information on service convergence and antitrust issues, see, e.g., Edward
D. Cavanagh, De-Regulation of the Air Waves: Is Antitrust Enough?, 17 ST. JOHN'S J.L.
COMM. 67 (2003).
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While it may be wise to wait a few years to see how effectively the
Framework Directive adjusts to changing technologies and market forces,
the United States should act quickly to adjust its legislation and regulations
to anticipate evolving technologies and market forces.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 26:447 (2006)
